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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
[1] Imagine someone has just committed a crime.  Shortly thereafter, 
law enforcement responds and quickly apprehends a suspect on the scene 
or close by.  In order to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the time 
and place of apprehending the suspect, combined with witness testimony 
or physical evidence, may be enough for the prosecution to meet its 
burden of proof. 
 
[2] Now imagine a longer, more complex investigation where law 
enforcement does not identify or apprehend a suspect for days, weeks, or 
even months after the crime occurred.  Law enforcement gathers some 
evidence, but the evidence by itself is not enough to convict.  If the 
prosecution can place the suspect in the vicinity of the crime scene at the 
time the crime occurred, then maybe it could corroborate other evidence to 
establish guilt.1  However, if physical evidence or witnesses cannot place 
                                                            
* Rosenberg & Fayne, L.L.P., Prince George’s County, Maryland; recently hired as an 
Associate Attorney upon anticipated admission to the Maryland Bar in December 2011; 
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a defendant at a crime scene, then how else can the prosecution carry its 
burden? 
 
[3] Law enforcement may attempt to place a suspect at a crime scene 
by subpoenaing and analyzing his or her cell phone records for the date 
and time of the crime.2  Whenever a cell phone makes a call, the call is 
                                                                                                                                                    
J.D., Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.  This article was written 
under the supervision of Professor Clifford Fishman of the Columbus School of Law in 
partial satisfaction of degree requirements.  I would like to thank Cliff and Professor A.G. 
Harmon for their assistance in the research and writing of this article.  
 
1 See, e.g., Staunton v. State, 784 N.W.2d 289, 299-300 (Minn. 2010) (finding the 
defendant guilty after using evidence to place the defendant in the vicinity of the crime 
scene, and offering corroborating evidence). 
 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 411 F. App’x 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 926-29 (11th Cir. 2009); Williamson v. United States, 
993 A.2d 599, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Cooper v. State, 45 So. 3d 490, 492-93 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010) (upholding trial court’s admission of expert testimony by Verizon 
Wireless store manager which used phone records to establish the defendant’s location on 
the date and time the crime was committed); Pullin v. State, 572 S.E.2d 722, 725 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2002); People v. Leak, 925 N.E.2d 264, 281-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); State v. 
Wright, No. 9-794/09-1736, 2010 WL 200052, at *4-8 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010); 
Canela v. State, 997 A.2d 793, 804 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (admitting evidence 
through expert testimony to explain where defendant was located when certain calls were 
made); Staunton, 784 N.W.2d at 299-300 (upholding conviction in part based on 
testimony interpreting cell site data which corroborated defendant’s commission of the 
crime); Francis v. State, 781 N.W.2d 892, 897-98 (Minn. 2010) (upholding conviction in 
part based on expert testimony placing the defendant in the general area of the shooting 
from cell site records); State v. Robinson, 724 N.W.2d 35, 61-69 (Neb. 2006); State v. 
Banks, Nos. 09AP-1087, 09AP-1088, 2010 WL 4793354, at *4-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 
23, 2010) (finding no reversible error where trial court admitted into evidence expert 
testimony placing defendant at crime scene through interpretation of cell phone records); 
cf. State v. Silva, 2011 WL 31362, at *4,*9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 6, 2011) 
(offering cell phone records to establish defendant’s alibi defense); Dorsey v. Delcupp, 
No. 1 CA-CV 08-0472, 2010 WL 475454, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010) (denying 
motion for additional discovery for plaintiff to establish alibi claim through cell phone 
records). 
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routed through a cell site located at a fixed geographic location.3  Cellular 
companies keep records of which cell site processes a call, and through 
this information law enforcement can infer the location of the cell phone 
user.4  Ideally, this information places the suspect at the scene of the 
crime.5  However, the cell phone record cannot always place the suspect’s 
location to a precise degree.6  Some courts have allowed police officers to 
testify and interpret cell site data, while other courts require expert 
testimony to admit such evidence.7 
 
[4] This article will explore the limitations and admissibility of using 
historical cell site data to prove the location of a cell phone at the time a 
crime was committed.  Part II will begin with an overview of how a 
cellular network works.  Next, Part III will discuss the various ways a cell 
phone tracks its own location and the limitations of using historical cell 
site data as a tracking method.  Part IV will analyze the admissibility of 
historical cell site data under the Federal Rules of Evidence, including its 
relevance, admission through lay witnesses, and admission through 
experts.  Although this analysis applies the Federal Rules, additional 
examples will discuss how various State courts have dealt with these 
issues.  Part V will discuss the constitutional implications of law 
enforcement seizing cell site data for a person’s phone and presentation as 
                                                            
3 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING: 
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 28:2 (2011). 
 
4 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, §§ 28:2, 29:38.  
 
5 Cf. Banks, 2010 WL 4793354, at *4 (discussing how a criminal intelligence analyst 
with the Ohio Attorney General’s office used cell phone information to create a map 
matching calls to a homicide location).  
 
6 See infra Part III (discussing various conditions that may affect the accuracy of cell site 
tracking methods). 
 
7 Compare Banks, 2010 WL 4793354, at *4 (admitting cell phone evidence through 
police testimony), with Williamson, 993 A.2d at 602 (admitting cell phone evidence 
through an expert witness), and Cooper, 45 So.3d at 493.  
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evidence in a criminal trial.  Finally, Part VI will make suggestions for a 
party seeking to introduce or preclude historical cell site evidence. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF CELLULAR PHONE TECHNOLOGY 
 
[5] A cellular phone operates as a two-way radio that transmits and 
receives signals throughout a cellular network.8  The design of a cellular 
network is divided into “geographic coverage areas called ‘cells,’” 
arranged in the pattern of a hexagonal grid or honeycomb.9  The point 
where three cells meet is called the cell site (or cell tower).10  The number 
of antennas operating on the cell site, the height of the antennas, 
topography of the surrounding land, and obstructions (both natural and 
man-made) determine the size of each cell’s coverage area.11  One cell 
may cover an area up to thirty miles from the site, for a total coverage area 
of approximately 2,700 square miles.12  Other cells may cover much 
smaller areas ranging from one to three miles from the site.13  Urban areas 
                                                            
8 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 28:2. 
 
9 See In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site 
Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
[hereinafter In re Application 1]; Cingular Wireless, L.L.C. v. Thurston Cnty., 129 P.3d 
300, 303 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
10 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 28:2.  
 
11 Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Town of Brookline, 520 F. Supp. 2d. 
238, 242 (D. Mass. 2007); Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Town of 
Wayland, 231 F. Supp. 2d. 396, 399 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 
12 Transcript of Record at 129-30, State v. Davis, No. MMX-CR08-0185484T (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Porter Hearing Tr.] (on file with the author).  If the 
coverage area is thought of as a circle and furthest distance from the cell site where 
service is available is the radius of that circle, then the coverage area can be easily 
calculated by simple mathematics, A = πr2.  So, the example noted above would be A = 
π(30)2 ≈ 2,700.  See id. at 130. 
 
13 See, e.g., Perez v. State, 980 So.2d 1126, 1130-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Saleh, No. 07AP-431, 2009 WL 840755, at * 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2009). 
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may have cell sites located every one-half to one mile, whereas more rural 
areas may have cell sites every three to five miles.14 
 
[6] As long as a cell phone is turned on, it periodically transmits a 
signal to the network in order to scan the strength of every potential cell 
site.15  When a user places a call, the cell phone connects to the cell site 
with the strongest signal.16  Adjoining cells provide some overlap in 
coverage to avoid disconnection from the network when the signal 
strength of the site servicing the call drops by transferring the call to the 
next cell with the strongest signal.17  This primary feature of the cellular 
design, and crux of its business model, provides that one cell site will pick 
up a call and ensure it goes through when another goes down.18  This 
process is known as a “hand-off.”19  A hand-off may occur because the 
signal of the first cell weakens, as the user moves away from the site, and 
then subsequently strengthens after recognizing a closer cell.20  Thus, 
handing-off will occur as a cell phone user moves throughout multiple 
                                                            
14 People v. Wells, No. A112173, 2007 WL 466963, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2007). 
 
15 See In re Application 1, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 450; FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 
28:2. 
 
16 Ameritech Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, No. 97-0068, 1997 
WL 603432, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1997). 
 
17 See Town of Brookline, 520 F. Supp. 2d. at 242 (D. Mass. 2007); Town of Wayland, 
231 F. Supp. 2d. at 399 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 
18 See Porter Hearing Tr., supra note 12, at 95; see also New York SMSA Ltd. v. Twp. of 
Mendham Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 840 A.2d 901, 905 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004). 
 
19 Town of Brookline, 520 F. Supp. 2d. at 242; Town of Wayland, 231 F. Supp. 2d. at 399. 
 
20 See Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston Cnty., 129 P.3d 300, 303 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2006); see, e.g., State v. Allen, No. 92482, 2010 WL 27548, at *5 (Ohio. App. Jan. 7, 
2010). 
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coverage areas.21  However, the geographic location of the user is not the 
only reason for a call switching cells, since many other factors may affect 
the signal strength between a cell phone and site.22  
 
[7] First, the technical characteristics of cell sites may affect signal 
strength: (1) the number of sites available;23 (2) maintenance or repairs 
being performed; (3) height of the cell tower; (4) height above sea level; 
(5) wattage output; and (6) range of coverage.24  Second, technical 
characteristics of the antennas on cellular sites may affect signal strength, 
such as the number of antennas, the angle and direction the antenna is 
facing, height of each antenna, and call traffic processed through each 
antenna.25  Third, technical characteristics of the phone, such as the 
wattage output and generation of the phone’s broadband capability, may 
affect signal strength.26  Fourth, signal strength may depend upon 
environmental and geographical factors, including the weather, 
                                                            
21 See Town of Brookline, 520 F. Supp. 2d. at 242; Cingular Wireless, 129 P.3d at 303 
n.3. 
 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 23-28 (listing factors affecting signal strength).  
 
23 See Comments of the Telecommunications Industry Association, Wireless E911 
Location Accuracy Requirements, PS Docket No. 07-114, Revision of the Commission’s 
Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, 
Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials-International, Inc. Request for 
Declaratory Ruling, CC Docket No. 94-102, 911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service 
Providers, WC Docket No. 05-196, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (rel. June 1, 2007) 
(“NPRM”) at 3 (filed Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Comments of the TIA], available at 
http://www.tiaonline.org/gov_affairs/fcc_filings/documents/TIAComments-E911.pdf. 
 
24 See Porter Hearing Tr., supra note 12, at 88-89. 
 
25 See Porter Hearing Tr., supra note 12, at 91-92. 
 
26 See Porter Hearing Tr., supra note 12, at 80. 
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topography, and level of urban development.27  Finally, indoor or outdoor 
use of the phone may alter the strength of the signal.28  
 
[8] Usually, cellular companies record the cell site to which a phone 
connects for “benign purposes, such as determining whether roaming 
charges apply and tracking call volume by location.”29  Recently, 
however, law enforcement has begun using cell site data to track the 
location of cell phones.30 
 
III. TRACKING CELLULAR PHONES 
 
[9] There are three basic methods used to track cellular phones: (1) 
GPS (Global Positioning System) technology; (2) capturing real-time cell 
site data; and (3) interpreting historical cell site data.31  GPS is a system of 
satellites and ground receivers used to locate a receiver’s position.32  A 
GPS receiver can track in real-time or make a record of its location with 
accuracy up to a few meters.33  GPS receivers are available to consumers 
and have applications available for cellular phones.34  GPS is the most 
accurate way to track location, but can only track a cellular phone if the 
                                                            
27 See Comments of the TIA at 3. 
 
28 See id.  
 
29 In re Application 1, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
 
30 See id.; supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 
31 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 29:35, 29:38. 
 
32 See generally Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment 
Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone 
Tracking, 64 MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1063-66 (2010). 
 
33 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 29:35; Koppel, supra note 32, at 1063-64.  
 
34 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 29:35; Martin A. Dolan et al., Use of Cell 
Phone Records and GPS Tracking, 24 CBA REC. 38, 39 (2010). 
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phone has GPS features.35  Therefore, cell phones without GPS features 
can only be tracked through cell site information.36 
 
[10] Real-time cell site data is gathered as a cell phone constantly scans 
the cellular network for the site with the strongest signal.37  Law 
enforcement can interpret the data to try and determine the present 
location of a cell phone.38  Historical cell site data records the information 
a cellular company keeps on a phone and may show a history of prior 
location.39  Law enforcement can use this data to place a suspect at the 
scene of a crime that has already been committed or track history of 
previous movement.40  However, the method of interpreting cell site data 
will determine its accuracy.41  This article focuses on problems with 




[11] A cell phone’s signal will often be received simultaneously by 
more than one cell site when operating in areas with a high concentration 
                                                            
35 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 28:2. 
 
36 See generally FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 29:1 (explaining the tracking 
capabilities of GPS separately from the tracking capabilities of cell phones).  
 
37 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 29:38; supra text accompanying note 10. 
 
38 See In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and 
Use of Pen Register and a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. [Sealed], 402 F. Supp. 
2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005) [hereinafter In re Application 2]. 
 
39 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 28:2. 
 
40 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 28:2. (describing the process of 
triangulation).  
 
41 See, e.g., FISHMAN & MCKENNA, at § 29:35 (describing the enhanced tracking 
capabilities of GPS technology). 
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of cell sites and overlaps in coverage.42  When this occurs, a mathematical 
process called triangulation may determine the phone’s location if either: 
(1) three points receiving the signal are known; or (2) two points receiving 
the signal are known, along with the direction in which the cell site 
received the signal.43  The accuracy of triangulation varies depending on a 
number of factors, such as the density of cell sites.44  Urban areas tend to 
have a higher density of cell sites; therefore, triangulation is most feasible 
in those areas.45 
                                                            
42 See In re Application 1, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
 
43 See id.; see also id. at 451, n.3 (providing a detailed discussion on the process of 
triangulation) 
 
Triangulation is the process of determining the coordinates of a point 
based on the known location of two other points. If the direction (but 
not distance) from each known point to the unknown point can be 
determined, then a triangle can be drawn connecting all three points. 
While only the length of one side of the triangle is known at first (the 
side connecting the two known points), simple trigonometry reveals the 
lengths of the other sides and so the position of the third point. In the 
context of cell site information, the two known points are the antenna 
towers, the third point is the cellular telephone, and the direction from 
each tower to the phone is discerned from the information about which 
face of each tower is facing the phone. 
 
Another method of tracking the location of cellular telephones, which 
also is sometimes called triangulation, is possible when a phone 
transmits signals to three antenna towers at once. Based on the strength 
of a phone's signal to a tower, and the time delay for the signal to reach 
the tower, one can determine the distance between the phone and the 
tower. One can then draw around the tower a circle, the radius of which 
is the distance from that tower to the phone. The location of the phone 
can be pinpointed by drawing circles around three of [sic] more towers 
and seeing where the circles intersect.  
 
44 In re Application 2, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 599, n.4. 
 
45 See id.; see also People v. Wells, No. VCR164967, 2007 WL 466963, at *2 (Solano 
Cnty., Cal. Feb. 14, 2007); see also supra text accompanying note 23. 
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[12] Although the Federal Communications Commission has mandated 
that, by September 11, 2012, network-based tracking for 911 calls must be 
accurate to within 100 meters for 67 percent of calls and 300 meters for 90 
percent of calls,46 some networks may not yet meet these requirements.47  
Also, non-emergency phone calls may not trigger the cellular network to 
record enough information to make triangulation possible.48 
 
B. Other Interpretations of Cell Site Data 
 
[13] Often historical cell site records only indicate the date, time, and 
duration of calls, whether calls are inbound or outbound, and show the 
originating and terminating cell sites for calls received or placed on the 
phone.49  Accordingly, triangulation cannot determine the location of the 
phone because either the phone connected with only one site (i.e., the 
originating and terminating cell sites are the same) or only two sites are 
known at different times (i.e., at the beginning and end of the call) without 
directional information.50  This gap in the records occurs because no 
                                                            
46 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2011). 
 
47 See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Borough of 
Paramus, No. 09-4940 (JLL), 2010 WL 4868218, at *5 (D. N.J. Nov. 22, 2010) 
(providing an example of a DAS network where triangulation of a cell phone is accurate 
to only a 1,000 foot radius). 
 
48 Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(b) (illustrating how the Federal Communications Commission 
only requires cellular providers to transmit “all wireless 911 calls” as opposed to all 
calls). 
 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 2346305, at *3 (N.D. 
Ind. June 8, 2010); In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Info., No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *3, 
n.2 (E.D. Wis. 2006) [hereinafter In re Application 3]; Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 190 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for Tracking Cell Phones, 
CNET NEWS (Feb. 11, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10451518-
38.html.  
 
50 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (illustrating how particular circumstances 
may prevent one from locating a phone using the process of triangulation). 
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business purpose exists for recording real-time cell site data,51 and cellular 
companies tend to only keep records of historical cell site data that are 
useful for billing purposes or to measure call traffic.52  An additional 
problem may arise in obtaining cell site data, because companies may only 
store data for six to twelve months before purging it from a cellular 
company’s system.53  If triangulation is not possible from the available 
records, then these records only show, at most, the phone’s coverage areas 
at the beginning and end of the call.54  
 
[14] Wilson v. State, a decision of the Texas Court of Appeals, provides 
an example of this kind of interpretation.55  In Wilson, an expert witness 
from Sprint used historical cell site data to place the defendant in the 
vicinity of the crime.56  During trial, the expert testified the cell site that 
processes a call is “usually” the closest site to the person making the 
call.57  The expert explained the cell site data from the defendant’s phone 
records reflected a map of his movements on the day in question.58  She 
testified to four specific movements corroborating the defendant’s 
                                                            
51 McCullagh, supra note 49 (“Cellular providers tend not to retain moment-by-moment 
logs of when each mobile device contacts the tower, in part because there’s no business 
reason to store the data, and in part because the storage costs would be prohibitive.”). 
 
52 See In re Application 1, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 451.  
 
53 McCullagh, supra note 49. 
 
54 See In re Application 3, at *3, n.2 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
 
55 See generally Wilson v. State, 195 S.W.3d 193, 200-02 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 
56 See id. at 196-97. 
 
57 Id. at 200. 
 
58 Id.  
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involvement in the crime.59  The Texas court ruled the expert’s testimony 
was admissible and upheld the defendant’s conviction.60 
 




[15] Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[a]ll relevant evidence is 
admissible,” unless otherwise excluded by law, and irrelevant evidence is 
inadmissible.61  Relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”62  “The Rule’s basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal 
one.”63  Indeed, in a criminal trial, the identity of the defendant as the 
perpetrator is a fact of consequence necessary to secure a conviction.64 
 
                                                            
59 Id. (explaining how the accuracy of the last two movements was confirmed by the 
defendant’s contact with police and transport to the police station). 
 
60 See Wilson, 195 S.W.3d at 202, 205. 
 
61 See FED. R. EVID. 402; see also FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee’s note 
(Proposed Rules) (“The exclusion of relevant evidence occurs in a variety of situations 
and may be called for by these rules, by the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, by 
Bankruptcy Rules, by Act of Congress, or by constitutional considerations.”). 
 
62 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 
63 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
 
64 Cf. McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993) (admitting evidence 
regarding the defendant’s possession of a knife, notwithstanding its prejudicial nature, 
because it made “his identity as the murderer, more probable . . . . ”).  
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[16] Relevant historical cell site data is offered to prove the phone’s 
user is the perpetrator of a crime through the inference of location.65  
However, when triangulation is not possible, the problem with using 
historical cell site records under this evidentiary theory is that they “were 
never intended to and do not indicate location of the [cell phone] in 
relation to any cell site.”66  At best, these records can only narrow location 
to the geographic coverage area of the originating and terminating cell 
sites, rather than pinpoint the specific location of the cell phone.67  It 
cannot be determined that the cell phone was closest to the site processing 
the call because factors other than geographic location can affect signal 
strength.68  
 
[17] A better theory on which to offer historical cell site data is not to 
prove where the phone user was at a specific time, but to prove where he 
or she could not have been.  For example, in United States v. Benford, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana ruled that 
an expert’s testimony on historical cell site data was relevant to rebut the 
defendant’s alibi defense.69  While investigating a possible arson, 
                                                            
65 See generally Coleman-Fuller v. State, 995 A.2d 985, 992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); 
Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 190 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Wilson, 195 S.W.3d at 
200 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 
66 Manfred Schenk, How to Read Cricket Call Detail Records, CHERRY BIOMETRICS, 
http://www.cherrybiometrics.com/How%20to%20read%20Cricket%20Call%20Detail%2
0and%20Manfred%20Schenkbio.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2011). 
 
67 Francis v. Fabian, 669 F. Supp. 2d 970, 987, n.5 (D. Minn. 2009); see United States v. 
Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 2346305, at *1 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2010). But cf. 
Wilson v. United States, 995 A.2d 174, 179 (D.C. 2010) (testifying expert says he was 
“one hundred percent certain” that at a given time the defendant was “nowhere near 
Upper Marlboro, Maryland” because a corresponding cell phone call connected to a 
tower in the District of Columbia which was the tower closest to where the victim’s body 
was found). 
 
68 See supra, Part II. 
  
69 Benford, 2010 WL 2346305, at *1. 
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“investigators questioned Brian Booker who was suspected of starting the 
fire.”70  Booker told investigators that during the time of the fire he was 
with Nichelle Benford, away from the location where the fire occurred.71  
Investigators subpoenaed Benford’s cell phone records containing 
historical cell site data which showed she was in the Chicago area during 
the fire; therefore, rebutting Booker’s claim he was with Benford.72  When 
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, Benford corroborated Booker’s 
alibi in contradiction of what law enforcement recently learned from her 
cell site records.73  In Benford’s subsequent prosecution for lying to the 
grand jury, the court held that an expert’s interpretation of the cell site data 
was relevant.74 
 
[18] Recognizing the accuracy limitations of historical cell site data for 
determining location, the additional problem exists of proving who 
possessed the cell phone at the time in question.75  There may exist a 
strong inference of possession if the cell phone has a service contract 
registered to the person whose location the offering party is trying to 
prove.  However, there is still a viable defense that someone other than the 
phone’s owner used the phone.76  
 





72 Id.  Chicago is 37 miles away from Schererville. See GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com/ (input “Chicago, Illinois” into the “A” form” and “Schererville, 
Indiana” into the “B” form).  
  
73 Benford, 2010 WL 2346305, at *1. 
 
74 Id. at *1-2. 
 
75 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 28:12; see also State v. Hayes, 2010 WL 
5344882, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2010) (“Detective Fitzgerald agreed that the 
cell phone records did not show who was actually using the phone in question.”). 
 
76 See Hayes, 2010 WL 5344882, at *6. 
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[19] In the case of pre-paid cell phones, the inference of who possessed 
the phone may be much weaker.  A pre-paid cell phone does not require 
the user to sign a contract or receive a billing statement from the cellular 
company, and the user may purchase the phone over the counter at any 
retailer.77  In lieu of a service contract, pre-paid cell phone users purchase 
minutes and upload them into the phone.78  Accordingly, it is easy to 
activate pre-paid phones under fictitious names, thereby making it difficult 
to identify the user.79  Given their low cost and simple activation, 
criminals can easily cycle through pre-paid phones to thwart the efforts of 
law enforcement and continuously change phone numbers to avoid 
wiretap investigations.80  For example, the use of multiple cell phones is a 
                                                            
77 See generally Adam Fendelman, Prepaid Cell Phones: Analysis of Pay as You Go vs. 
Monthly Contract Plans, ABOUT.COM (Jan. 1, 2010), http://cellphones.about.com/od/ 
serviceplananalysis/a/payasyougo.htm; GoPhone Plans, GOPHONE, http://www. 
wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/cell-phone-plans/pyg-cell-phone-plans.jsp?wtslotcli 
ck=1-0050tw-0-2&_requestid=254769 (last visited Sept. 08, 2011); Virgin Mobile 
Prepaid Cellular, PREPAID REVIEWS, http://www.prepaidreviews.com/virginmobile.html 
(last visited Sep. 17, 2011).  
 
78 See Fendelman, supra note 77.  
 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Lomeli, No. 8:10-cr-00158-LES-FG3, 2010 WL 5798589, at 
*2 (D. Neb. Dec. 9, 2010) (describing the cellular phone used by the defendant as “a 
prepaid Cricket phone with a fictitious address); Esparza v. Schomig, No. 09-CV-01974-
L (JMA), 2010 WL 5535756, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) (describing how police 
could determine the number of a target pre-paid phone but not the user); United States v. 
Dadanovic, No. 09-63-ART, 2010 WL 3620251, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 10, 2010) 
(“Further, investigators knew that members of the suspected organization frequently 
called pre-paid numbers registered in obviously fictitious names.”); Eberle v. State, 942 
N.E.2d 848, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Commonwealth v. Miranda, Nos. 09-10935, 09-
10936, 2011 WL 941237, at *2, n.10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2011 (“Drug dealers 
make use of such pre-paid cellular phones because they do not require contracts . . . 
making it more difficult to identify the user of the cell phone.”). 
 
80 See Ford v. State, No. 02-09-00112-CR, 2010 WL 4261601, at *2 (Tex. App. Oct. 28, 
2010) (discussing how pre-paid phones that are used in this manner have attained the 
nickname “burners” because once either the illegal purpose of using the phone is 
complete or law enforcement starts investigation the phone the user can simply throw the 
phone away and get a new one). 
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common practice for drug dealing where a person uses different phones to 
communicate with family, suppliers, and customers.81 
 
[20] Therefore, the identity of a phone’s user may create an additional 
hurdle in the admissibility of cell site records under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 104.  Specifically, Rule 104(b) provides that “[w]hen the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, 
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence 
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.”82  This 
suggests that the location of the phone is not relevant to prove the location 
of a person until the offering party can first prove that the person 
possessed the cell phone.83 
 
[21] The following example demonstrates the unique dilemma with pre-
paid phones.  Buyer calls Seller to purchase drugs on a pre-paid phone.  
Seller tells Girlfriend that he is going to make a deal and will be back 
soon.  Seller and Buyer meet, the deal goes bad, and Buyer shoots and 
kills Seller.  Buyer flees the scene.  There are no witnesses.  During the 
investigation, police talk to Girlfriend and she tells them that Seller left to 
make a deal and never came home.  A review of Seller’s phone records 
                                                            
81 Accord United States v. Young, 609 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Rogers, 556 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2009) (admitting testimony that use of multiple 
cell phones is common in conducting drug business); United States v. Bailey, 510 F.3d 
562, 567 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[D]ealers often carry two cell phones – one to contact 
customers and one to contact suppliers – so that if police trace the call records of their 
customers it will not lead to their suppliers.”) ; United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 341-
42 (3rd Cir. 2002) (holding modus operandi of drug dealers and use of cell phones to 
evade investigation is admissible expert testimony); Commonwealth v. Dancy, 912 
N.E.2d 525, 529-30 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (upholding trial court’s denial of motion for 
required finding of not guilty in part because a jury could rationally conclude from police 
officer’s testimony that the use of multiple cell phones is indicative of drug dealing). 
 
82 FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
 
83 See FED. R. EVID. 104(b); cf. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 242-43 (Md. 2009) 
(discussing how it is error for a trial court to admit expert testimony where a condition 
necessary for proper application of the testimony is not met). 
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show the last number to contact him was the pre-paid phone.  Police 
contact the phone’s service provider and records still exist showing the 
originating and terminating cell sites for the call to Seller.  Although the 
phone is registered to a fake name, police find the phone last contacted the 
cell site closest to Neighborhood and begin looking for suspects in the 
area. 
 
[22] A year passes before the police arrest Suspect who lives in 
Neighborhood.  A search of Suspect’s home does not produce the pre-paid 
phone.  Suspect maintains he is innocent and tells police he cannot 
remember where he was the night of the shooting because it was too long 
ago.  Should the prosecution be allowed to introduce the cell site data from 
the pre-paid phone as evidence Suspect could be the shooter simply 
because he lives in Neighborhood?  Here, the condition of relevancy is 
that Suspect used the pre-paid phone.  Unless the prosecution can 
introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the Suspect used the 
pre-paid phone, the location of the phone as interpreted through cell 
records should be irrelevant. 
 
B. Lay Witness Testimony 
 
[23] In general, lay witness testimony is limited to matters in which the 
witness has personal knowledge.84  This concept is rooted in the common 
law’s assurance that evidence is admitted from its most reliable source.85  
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, opinions or inferences of a lay 
witness (who is not testifying as an expert) are limited to those: “(a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in 
                                                            
84 See FED. R. EVID. 602; see also FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note (“‘[A] 
witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an 
opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a ‘most pervasive 
manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of 
information.’”). 
 
85 See FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note. 
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issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”86  Other opinions by a lay 
witness are otherwise inadmissible.87 
 
[24] The first requirement of Federal Rule 701 is simply that of first-
hand knowledge.88  The second requirement of the rule ensures that the 
testimony is “helpful in resolving issues.”89  The third requirement of the 
rule clarifies “any part of a witness' testimony that is based upon scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge . . . is governed by the standards 
of Rule 702” and cannot come in through 701.90  The difference in the 
requirements of Rule 701 and 702 reflects the distinction that lay witness 
testimony “results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,” 
whereas expert testimony “results from a process of reasoning which can 
be mastered only by specialists in [a given] field.”91  Therefore, assuming 
knowledge and helpfulness are satisfied, a lay witness should be able to 
testify about cell site records only if they do not implicate scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge.92 
 
[25] Perez v. State, a decision from the Florida Court of Appeals, 
provides a good example of lay witness testimony about cell records 
consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence.93  Over the defendant’s 
                                                            
86 FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 
87 See also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168-69 (1988) (noting that the 
traditional requirement that lay witness testimony is restricted to facts and not opinions 
serves like a best evidence rule) (citation omitted); cf. FED. R. EVID. 701.  
 










93 See generally Perez v. State, 980 So. 2d 1126, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
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objection at trial, records custodians from Sprint-Nextel and Metro PCS 
testified to the time phone calls were placed, the location of the cell sites 
receiving the calls, and that “persons making and receiving cell calls 
would physically be not more than three miles from the receiving 
tower.”94  The custodians then compared the locations of the cell sites on a 
map.95  On appeal, the defendant argued that this testimony was erroneous 
because the witnesses lacked the requisite “expertise or personal 
knowledge.”96  
 
[26] The District Court of Appeals of Florida held that the custodians’ 
testimony did not reflect expert opinions because it only provided general 
information on how to interpret phone records and how the records reflect 
cell sites.97  Accordingly, the jury did not need an expert to help them 
determine the location of the cell sites on a map.98  It appeared important 
to the court that the testimony “did not reveal the precise location within 
[each cell’s coverage] radius from which the calls were generated.”99  This 
suggests the testimony was acceptable from lay witnesses because it left 
the jury to infer the location of the defendant with respect to crime based 
on the state’s case as a whole, rather than drawing the inference for them 
based solely on cell phone records.100 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
94 See id. at 1129, 1131. 
 
95 See id. at 1131. 
 
96 Id.  
 
97 See id. at 1131-32. 
 
98 See Perez, 980 So. 2d at 1132. 
 
99 See id. at 1131. 
 
100 See id. at 1132. 
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[27] In State v. Hayes, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee 
went one step further than Perez and allowed a lay witness to draw the 
inference of location.101  In Hayes, a detective testified, as a lay witness, 
that he read cell site locations from phone records and plotted them on a 
map.102  From this, he inferred that the defendant travelled in a path 
consistent with his commission of the crime.103  The detective conceded 
he was not an expert in cell site technology and subsequently, the court 
held this testimony did not require an expert since “a lay person could plot 
the locations of the [cell sites] on a map and draw the same inference,” 
and it “did not require specialized knowledge . . . .”104    
 
[28] The distinction between the outcomes in Perez and Hayes is subtle, 
yet marks two divergent paths in the admissibility of historical cell site 
testimony.  Perez correctly limited lay testimony to discuss the general 
features of phone records and cell sites.  Hayes, however, went one step 
too far by allowing the lay witness to testify to the intra-cell site position 
of a phone user because the testimony requires specialized knowledge that 
relates to the scientific and technological features of cell sites.  Therefore, 
courts should use caution to properly limit the scope of lay witness 
testimony to prevent juries from according improper weight to unqualified 
opinions.   
 
C. Expert Testimony 
 
[29] The advantage of offering an expert’s testimony over that of a lay 
witness is that experts have “wide latitude to offer opinions, including 
                                                            
101 See State v. Hayes, No. M2008-02689-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5344882, at *10 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2010). 
 
102 See id. at *5, *10. 
 
103 See id. 
 
104 Id. at *10. 
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those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.”105  
Additionally, experts may impress jurors, causing jurors to give greater 
weight to the expert evidence introduced.106   
  
1. Overview of Federal Rule 702 
 
[30] Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert 
testimony and has several requirements.107  First, expert testimony is 
proper when it concerns “scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge” that will “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue . . . .”108  The latter part of this requirement 
might also be viewed as an initial threshold of relevancy.109  Second, the 
witness must qualify as an expert from “knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education . . . .”110  Finally, the testimony may take the form of 
“an opinion or otherwise” if the testimony is “based upon sufficient facts 
or data,” is produced from “reliable principles and methods,” and the 
expert has “applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case.”111  The underlying purpose of Rule 702 is to engage the trial judge 
in an important gate-keeping function to exclude expert testimony that is 
either unreliable or unhelpful.112  
                                                            
105 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). Compare FED. R. 
EVID. 701, with FED. R. EVID. 702, and FED. R. EVID. 703.  
 
106 See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978) (“[S]cientific proof may in some 
instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury.”). 
 




109 See FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 
110 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 
111 See id. 
 
112 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
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[31] In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme 
Court of the United States enumerated general factors to help a trial court 
assess whether scientific reasoning or methodology is valid and properly 
applied to a case.113  These factors include: (1) “whether it can be (and has 
been) tested;” (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication;” (3) whether there is a “known or potential 
rate of error” and “standards controlling the techniques operations;” (4) 
and whether the methodology has received  “general acceptance” within 
the scientific community.114  The Supreme Court later extended Daubert 
beyond scientific reasoning to testimony based on technical or other 
specialized knowledge in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael.115  None of 
the Daubert factors are dispositive; therefore, a trial court’s inquiry will 
depend on the specific circumstances.116  When making a determination, a 
court must “focus . . . solely on principles and methodology, not on the 
conclusions that they generate.”117  This is not to say, however, that 
                                                            
113 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 
 
114 See id. at 593-94.  
 
115 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 137, 147 (1999); see also United 
States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting there is no longer a 
distinction under Rule 702 between “scientific” testimony and testimony based on 
“technical” or “other specialized knowledge”). 
 
116 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141 (1999) (“[T]he test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and 
Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts 
or in every case.”); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579, 593 (“Publication (which is but one 
element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily 
correlate with reliability . . . .”). But, submission to the scrutiny of the scientific 
community is a component of “good science,” in part because it increases the likelihood 
that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. 
Id. at 594 (“Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular 
evidence admissible, and ‘a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal 
support within the community,’ . . . may be properly viewed with skepticism.”). 
 
117 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
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conclusions and methodology are completely independent of one 
another.118  
 
[32] In Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
court might reject an expert’s testimony where “there is simply too great 
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”119  Robert 
Joiner’s work exposed him to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB’s) and he 
claimed this exposure caused his cancer.120  Joiner would put his hands in 
fluids containing PCB’s and occasionally some would splash into his eyes 
or mouth.121  The trial court denied Joiner’s attempt to offer expert 
testimony about a study where infant mice developed cancer after being 
injected with “highly concentrated[,] massive doses” of PCB’s directly 
into their stomachs.122  The Supreme Court ruled the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion since this animal study was too dissimilar to the facts 
of Joiner’s case; Joiner was an adult human whereas the study was on 
infant mice, the amount of PCB exposure was drastically different, and the 






                                                            
118 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
 
119 See id.; see also Barnes v. Cont’l Tire N. Am. Inc., No. C05-5214 RBL, 2006 WL 
2076561, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (“In determining whether expert testimony is 
sufficiently reliable the Court can consider whether the expert has unjustifiably 
extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion.”). 
 
120 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139.  
 
121 See id.  
 
122 See id. at 137. 
 
123 See id. at 144-45. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 24 
2. Application to historical cell data 
 
a. Scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge? 
 
[33] The first step of analysis under Rule 702 is to determine whether 
testimony concerns “scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge.”124  A witness that interprets historical cell site data should be 
certified as an expert if they employ scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge. 
 
[34] In Wilder v. State, the trial court admitted lay testimony of the lead 
detective who extensively discussed historical cell phone analysis to create 
a map plotting the defendant’s movements and proximity to the crime 
scene at the time of the shooting.125  The detective testified in detail to the 
meaning of information contained in the cell records, the usefulness and 
capability of using cell records to track a person, and his method of using 
a software program to plot the location of cell phone calls and the 
movement of the defendant.126  On appeal, the defendant contended that 
an expert witness should have presented this testimony.127  
 
[35] In ruling on this issue, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
drew an important distinction.128  Although authority supports admitting 
law enforcement’s lay testimony about the location of cell sites, an expert 
witness is required to explain the use of cell records to determine location 
of the call.129  The information contained in cell phone bills, such as the 
                                                            
124 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 
125 See Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 180, 187-88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
 
126 See id. at 192-93. 
 
127 See id. at 196. 
 
128 See generally id. at 196, 200.  
 
129 See id. at 198.  
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date or time of calls and whether a call was inbound or outbound, has 
become generally understood and does not need to be admitted into 
evidence though an expert.130  However, this does not extend to allowing a 
lay witness to offer opinion testimony about the location of a phone within 
a cell site.131  Translating information contained in cell records into 
locations where the cell phone was used requires “some specialized 
knowledge or skill . . . that is not in the possession of the [jury.]”132  
Accordingly, the Wilder court held that the admission of the detective’s 
testimony was reversible error and should only have been admitted 
through an expert.133  
 
[36] Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
held in U.S. v. Yeley-Davis that it was error for the trial court to admit lay 
testimony from a police officer about how cell sites processed calls.134  
The court recognized that “testimony concerning how cell phone towers 
operate constitute[s] expert testimony because it involve[s] specialized 
knowledge not readily accessible to any ordinary person.”135  
 
b. Who qualifies as an expert? 
 
[37] A witness must qualify as an expert from “knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education.”136  Kumho Tire states that, when 
                                                            
130 See Wilder, 991 A.2d at 199.  
 
131 See, e.g., id. at 200.  
 
132 Id. at 200.  
 
133 See id. at 200; see also Coleman-Fuller v. State, 995 A.2d 985, 1010 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2010) (applying the holding in Wilder the court found a detective’s testimony 
inadmissible because he was not qualified as an expert).  
 
134 See United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 685 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 
135 Id. at 684. 
 
136 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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certifying an expert, the issue is not whether his field of expertise is 
generally considered reliable, but rather more specifically whether this 
expert has sufficient knowledge and has reliably drawn conclusions 
helpful in this case.137  This is especially important with respect to cell 
phone tracking where the reliability of the underlying scientific or 
technical methodology is not in major dispute.  In this case, the gravamen 
of attacks on experts should focus on the expert’s personal knowledge and 
experience.138  In evaluating testimony regarding an expert’s experience, it 
may prove particularly relevant to assess the expert’s rate of error, general 
acceptance of the methodology employed, and how the expert’s 
preparation relates to others in the field.139  Indeed, industry standards 
have become increasingly important when evaluating experience-based 
testimony.140  This is because although an expert can self-proclaim his 
methodology as reliable, nothing requires a court to accept an expert’s ipse 
dixit.141 
                                                            
137 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999). 
 
138 See Id. at 150; Rivera v. Mill Hollow Corp., No. 96CIV.8150(TPG), 2000 WL 
1175001, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2000) (discussing Kumho Tire). 
 
139 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151; Groobert v. President of Georgetown Coll., 219 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 
140 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 157. 
 
We have found no indication in the record that other experts in the 
industry use Carlson's two-factor test or that tire experts such as 
Carlson normally make the very fine distinctions about, say, the 
symmetry of comparatively greater shoulder tread wear that were 
necessary, on Carlson's own theory, to support his conclusions. Nor, 
despite the prevalence of tire testing, does anyone refer to any articles 
or papers that validate Carlson's approach. Id. 
 
141 See id. (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)); see also Barnes v. 
Cont’l Tire N. Am. Inc., No. C05-5214 RBL, 2006 WL 2076561, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 
24, 2006) (admitting expert testimony upon determination it “has a sufficient factual 
basis”). 
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[38] Three types of expert witnesses may testify regarding cell site 
location evidence: law enforcement; agents from cellular companies; and a 
hybrid approach featuring some combination of the two.142  Among law 
enforcement, a wide spectrum of background and experience has been 
found sufficient to qualify an expert.  On the more qualified end of the 
spectrum, a federal district court admitted as an expert a witness who: (1) 
worked nine years as an FBI agent whose work focused on cell phone 
tracking; (2) completed two FBI courses on cellular technology and 
networks and five others on radio frequency theory and analyzing cell 
phone calls; (3) taught an FBI three-day course to other agents five times 
on cell phone tracking; and (4) was in the middle of a master’s degree in 
geospatial technology.143  This expert testified to methods and devices he 
used to approximate cell sites’ coverage areas and to determine the point 
where a hand-off occurred between two sites.144  From this, he could 
narrow down the area from which a cell phone call was made.145  On the 
other hand, a Texas state court admitted a less qualified expert who: (1) 
worked four years as a police officer; (2) attended a three-day course in 
cell phone tracking; and (3) performed tracking analysis twelve times 
previously.146  However, in admitting this witness as an expert, the court 
noted that the witness’s testimony only concerned the general vicinity of 
the cell phone and did not try to determine a more precise location.147  
Therefore, it appears that the precision of the expert’s testimony is 
dependent on their qualifications. 
                                                            
142 See generally infra notes 145-62 and accompanying text. 
 
143 See United States v. Allums, No. 2:08-CR-30 TS, 2009 WL 806748, at *2 (D. Utah 
March 24, 2009). 
 
144 See id. at *1. 
 
145 See id. 
 
146 See Saenz v. State, No. 13-10-00216-CR, 2011 WL 578757, at *3 (Tex. App. Feb. 17, 
2011). 
 
147 See id. at *4. 
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[39] Likewise, the qualifications of agents from cellular companies 
vary.148  One federal district court admitted an expert employed as a radio 
frequency engineer for Ericsson whose duties included management of the 
cellular network and determining cell site coverage.149  Part of his job 
included mapping coverage areas for business purposes including sales.150  
The court allowed this expert to testify about a coverage map he created to 
approximate the defendant’s location not just based on his experience, but 
also because of his personal knowledge about the coverage areas of the 
particular towers that were the subject of his testimony.151   
 
[40] Other courts have admitted cellular company employees as experts 
based on their experience with phone records.152  One court admitted an 
expert who, despite admitting to a lack of specialized knowledge in 
cellular technology or corresponding scientific theories: (1) worked four 
years for Sprint; (2) her job duties included interpreting customer records 
to determine the cell sites and addresses from which calls obtained their 
signals; (3) had four to six months training from Sprint in electronic 
surveillance; and (4) performed tracking analysis frequently to assist law 
enforcement and 911 operators.153  Another court admitted as an expert a 
store manager for Verizon based on his training and experience with: (1) 
phone records; (2) phone servicing; (3) technical support; and (4) how 
calls are transmitted through Verizon’s network.154 
                                                            
148 See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. 
 
149 See United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 2346305, at *2 (N.D. Ind. 
June 8, 2010). 
 
150 See id. at *3. 
 
151 See id. at *2-3. 
 
152 See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 45 So. 3d 490, 492-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Wilson v. 
State, 195 S.W.3d 193,  
196-97 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 
153 Wilson, 195 S.W.3d at 200-01. 
 
154 See Cooper, 45 So. 3d at 493. 
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[41] Additionally, Wilder leaves open the door for law enforcement to 
give lay testimony when accompanied by a sponsoring expert witness.155  
In State v. Banks, the trial court admitted the testimony of three witnesses 
placing the defendant near the crime scene.156  First, an expert from 
Sprint/Nextel testified regarding how cell sites handle calls and the extent 
to which cell site data can determine call locations.157  Second, a records 
custodian for Sprint/Nextel testified and provided the records for the 
defendant’s cell phone.158  Third, a criminal intelligence analyst who 
worked for the Attorney General’s office used the information provided by 
Sprint/Nextel to create a map tracing the defendant’s movements on the 
day in question.159  In upholding this admission of witnesses and 
testimony, the Court of Appeals of Ohio stated that this would satisfy 







                                                                                                                                                    
 
155 See Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 197 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); State v. Banks, 
Nos. 09AP-1087, 09AP-1088, 2010 WL 4793354, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010) 
(discussing Wilder); see also United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 929 n.27 (11th Cir. 
2009) (admitting the testimony of a Miami-Dade detective in conjunction with the 
testimony of the MetroPCS records custodian). 
 
156 See Banks, 2010 WL 4793354, at *4. 
 
157 See id. 
 
158 See id. 
 
159 See id.  Although this witness was not qualified as an expert by the prosecution, it was 
within the trial court’s discretion to treat him as one based on training and experience.  
See id. at *12. 
 
160 See Banks, 2010 WL 4793354, at *12. 
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c. Reliability of principles and methodology 
 
[42] Even if an expert is qualified, a party can still object to the 
reliability of methods used by the expert to draw conclusions.161  At least 
two federal courts have held Daubert hearings to assess the reliability and 
relevance of expert testimony based on historical cell site interpretation.162  
In United States v. Allums, the prosecution’s proposed expert testimony 
concerned a method of approximating cell sites’ coverage areas that 
determined the point of a hand-off between two sites to indicate the area in 
which a call was placed.163  First, the expert obtained the originating cell 
sites for each call made from the defendant’s phone and purchased the 
same phone from the same service provider.164  Second, he put the phone 
in “engineering mode” so it would display in real-time the connecting cell 
site.165  Simultaneously, he used a device called a “Stingray” to measure 
from his location the cell site with the strongest signal.166  Finally, the 
expert drove around the area surrounding the cell sites to approximate its 
coverage area and points of handing off.167  He applied this method to the 
                                                            
161 See Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 188-89 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“At the 
beginning of trial, the defense moved in limine to exclude testimony about how the police 
managed to track [the defendant’s] movements . . . by the use of cellular telephone 
records.”). 
 
162 See United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 2346305, at *2-3 (N.D. Ind. 
June 8, 2010); United States v. Allums, No. 2:08-CR-30 TS, 2009 WL 806748, at *1-2 
(D. Utah March 24, 2009); see also Pullin v. State, 534 S.E.2d 69, 71 (Ga. 2000) 
(upholding the scientific validity of expert testimony concerning cell site tracking 
analysis). 
 
163 See Allums, 2009 WL 806748, at *1. 
 
164 See id.  
 
165 See id. 
 
166 See id. 
 
167 See id. 
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historical cell site data he obtained to determine the approximate location 
of each call made by the defendant.168  
 
[43] The United States District Court for the District of Utah held that 
this methodology was reliable under Daubert because the FBI had used it 
successfully to capture fugitives in hundreds of previous investigations.169  
Furthermore, consistent with the Daubert factors, this methodology was 
tested and generally accepted by law enforcement.170  Although the court 
was not presented with peer review or rates of error for this expert’s 
methods, the court held that previous success of the methodology was 
sufficient to establish reliability.171 
 
[44] In Benford, the defendant challenged the expert’s methodology of 
using a “prediction tool” to create maps, based on her call records of 
coverage areas where the defendant could have been.172  The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana deemed his 
methodology reliable because: (1) the expert relied on data and reports 
supplied by the service provider which are “of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the field”; (2) he normally prepares these maps for 
business purposes and not just for litigation; and (3) the service provider 
constantly runs tests on phones and tracks their connections to cell sites to 
keep predictions of coverage area “as accurate and up-to-date as 
possible.”173    
 
                                                            
168 See Allums, 2009 WL 806748, at *1. 
 
169 See id. at *2. 
 
170 See id. 
 
171 See id. 
 
172 See United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 2346305, at *3 (N.D. Ind. 
June 8, 2010). 
 
173 Id. (crediting the expert’s claims that his methodology was not disputed in his 
technical community). 
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[45] Unlike real-time cell phone tracking, the reliability of which is not 
questioned upon capturing the target of its investigation, the methodology 
employed in historical cell site analysis should be properly scrutinized.  
Judges should consider these methods reliable only when they are actually 
employed successfully by law enforcement in the field, not solely upon an 
unsubstantiated belief in their scientific reliability.  Methods employed by 
service providers should be granted more weight than law enforcement 
because they are usually less biased and based on specialized knowledge 
of their own networks.  Properly ordering these considerations will 
prevent backward looking methods from bootstrapping reliability. 
 
D. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1. Procedural Issues 
 
[46] A party against whom cell site evidence is offered should consider 
bringing a motion in limine to exclude it on grounds of admissibility.174  
Otherwise, a party should timely raise an objection at trial on Daubert 
grounds to preserve the right to object to scientific or technical evidence 
and preserve the issue on appeal.175  
 
2. Weight vs. Admissibility; Probative Value vs. Unfair Prejudice 
 
[47] The standard for admitting expert testimony under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 is liberal and flexible.176  Although this appears to favor the 
offering party, the objecting party should not forget that the Daubert 
                                                            
174 Daniel K. Gelb, An Approach to Cell Phone Evidence for Criminal Defense Attorneys, 
CHAMPION, Nov. 2009, at 28, 32. 
 
175 See FED. R. EVID. 103(a); cf. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Grynberg, 201 F.3d 1277, 1289-
90 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing the possibility of a party waiving their right to appeal 
without a timely objection). 
 
176 Groobert v. President and Dir. of Georgetown Coll., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 
2002) (citing Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. 137 1999). 
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factors for assessing reliability are not exclusive.177  Thus, creative 
counsel will have room for argument depending on the expert in question, 
issues of the case, and methodology used.178 
 
[48] When arguing against the admission of an expert’s testimony, a 
party should not conflate the questions of weight and admissibility.179  An 
expert’s shortcomings in his analysis do not necessarily render his 
methodology completely unreliable and inadmissible, rather the jury may 
simply accord less weight to his testimony.180  Indeed, as the Daubert 
court recognized, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional 
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”181  
For example, when an expert approximates call location based on data 
from the closest processing cell site, counsel may cross-examine the 
expert about other factors affecting signal strength and the expert’s basis 
of knowledge such as: (1) whether the expert has inspected this cell site’s 
features that affect call processing; or (2) whether the expert has only 
reviewed phone records lacking such information.182 
 
                                                            
177 See id. (“The Supreme Court has recognized that ‘the factors identified in Daubert 
may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability; depending on the nature of the issue, 
the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.’”). 
 
178 See id. 
 
179 See id. 
 
180 See Voilas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 452, 462 (D.N.J. 1999) (explaining 
how flaws in an expert’s testimony should be “tested in the crucible of the adversarial 
system”). 
 
181 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). 
 
182 See United States v. Allums, No. 2:08-CR-30 TS, 2009 WL 806748, at *2 (D. Utah 
Mar. 24, 2009); United States v. Allums, No. 2:08-CR-30 TS, 2009 WL 922185, at *2 
(D. Utah Mar. 31, 2009). 
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[49] Although relevant, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 excludes an 
expert’s testimony if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”183  Unlike lay testimony, expert 
testimony carries risks because it can be powerful, misleading, and 
difficult to evaluate.184  For example, an expert’s general opinion on how 
to decide the case, or testimony to facts rather than opinions, should raise 
concerns of prejudice outweighing probative value.185 
 
[50] If improperly admitted, such evidence may “assume a posture of 
mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury,”186 and unlike lay witnesses, it is 
more difficult to discredit an expert.187  Due to these risks, a trial judge 
should carefully weigh the prejudice and probative value of expert 
testimony under Rule 403.188 
 
3. Hearsay; Foundational Issues 
 
[51] Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is inadmissible 
unless an exception exists within the Rules or other law.189  Hearsay is an 
out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.190  
                                                            
183 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 
184 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (1993). 
 
185 See Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212 (D. Mass. 
2009). 
 
186 Reed v. Maryland, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978) (quoting United States v. Addison, 
498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
 
187 See Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 245 (Md. 2009). 
 
188 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
 
189 See FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 
190 See FED. R. EVID. 801. 
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Hence, cell phone records offered to prove their contents are hearsay.191  
They may be admissible, however, under the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule.192 
 
[52] Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) exempts business records from 
exclusion under the hearsay rule if the information contained within the 
records was known at the time the records were made and if the records 
were created and stored in the regular course of business, unless 
preparation of the records indicates a lack of trustworthiness.193  Records 
prepared in anticipation of litigation by a business fall outside the scope of 
Rule 803(6) because they lack trustworthiness as the self-serving motives 
in their creation outweigh the principle of accuracy that underscores the 
exception for regularly recorded business activities.194  Accordingly, 
courts have admitted cell phone records under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule.195  
 
[53] As a foundation for admissibility, either a custodian or other 
qualified witness must authenticate these records or the business must 
certify the records.196  Failure to properly authenticate cell phone records 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
191 Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
 




194 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, 5 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 33:17 (7th ed. 
2010); see also Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943). 
 
195 See, e.g., United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 678 (10th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 928-29 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wills, 346 
F.3d 476, 490 (4th Cir. 2003).  
 
196 FED. R. EVID. 803(6); FED. R. EVID. 902(11); FED. R. EVID. 902(12).  For examples of 
affidavits authenticating cell phone records, see Fry, 885 N.E.2d at 747; Smith v. State, 
839 N.E.2d 780, 785-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
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prevents a witness from testifying to their contents.197  With respect to cell 
phone tracking, a unique authentication issue arises when a witness 
testifies about a tracking map created from cell phone records.198  If the 
witness is a custodian or otherwise qualified to authenticate the underlying 
records and subsequently authenticates the records, he may testify about 
the substance of the tracking map and how he created it without admitting 
the actual phone records into evidence.199  Otherwise, any analysis of cell 
phone records conducted by a witness is inadmissible without first 
authenticating the underlying records through a sponsoring witness or 
certifying affidavit.200   
 
[54] In almost all cases cell phone records will be admissible under the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule.  Therefore, the hurdle to 
admissibility lies in authentication.  Tracking maps created from cell 
phone records should only be admitted with proper authentication of the 
underlying records.  This prevents parties from offering evidence that may 
contain hearsay or lack a proper foundation, and would allow a witness to 







                                                            
197 See State v. Courtney, 258 S.W.3d 117, 119-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Miller v. State, 
208 S.W.3d 554, 561-63 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (finding error where trial court admitted 
cell phone records without testimony or affidavit from service provider’s custodian or 
records or other qualified witness). 
 
198 See State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *6-7 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 
2010). 
 
199 See id. at *6-8. 
 
200 See United States v. Keyes, 214 Fed. Appx. 145, 156 (3rd Cir. Jan. 17, 2007) (“[A] 
proper foundation should have been laid for the phone records analyzed by [the witness] . 
. . .”).  
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
A. Confrontation Clause 
 
[55] The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”201  After a somewhat 
murky history,202 the Supreme Court of the United States held in 
Crawford v. Washington that the Confrontation Clause guarantees 
criminal defendants the procedural right to be confronted with witnesses 
who bear testimony against them.203  This constitutional right mandates a 
defendant have the reliability of evidence against him assessed “in a 
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”204  
“Testimonial” evidence is subject to the Confrontation Clause whereas 
“nontestimonial” evidence is not.205  Therefore, the government cannot 
admit testimonial evidence in a criminal trial unless the defendant is 
confronted with, and given an opportunity to cross-examine, the 
witness.206  The only two exceptions are: (1) where the witness is 
unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine them; and (2) the common law doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.207 
                                                            
201 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 
202 See generally Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An 
Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995). 
 
203 See, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43 (2004). 
 
204 Id. at 61. 
 
205 Id. at 68. 
 
206 See id. 
 
207 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 368 (2008) (holding that in order to for a defendant 
to forfeit the right of confrontation, they must have procured the witness’s unavailability 
for the purpose of preventing testimony; not merely for having caused unavailability); 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. 
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[56] In Crawford, the court loosely defined “testimonial” evidence, but 
failed to give any comprehensive definition.208  However, the court did 
state that business records are nontestimonial and later affirmed this 
notion209 because they are “created for the administration of an entity's 
affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial. 
. . .”210  Accordingly, various state and federal courts have held that 
affidavits authenticating cell phone records including cell site information 
are nontestimonial and are admissible at trial without producing a 
representative from the phone company for cross-examination.211  
Therefore, a defendant will lose a Confrontation Clause challenge for 
admitting cell phone records unless they can show the purpose in creating 
the records was for use in a criminal trial, rather than for business.212 
 
B. Fourth Amendment 
 
[57] The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.213  Fourth Amendment protections 
extend to people in areas of life where they have a reasonable expectation 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
208 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68. 
 
209 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2009); Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 
210 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-40. 
 
211 See, e.g., United States v. Green, No. 10-10300, 2010 WL 3401485, at *2 (11th Cir. 
Aug. 31, 2010); United States v. Flores, No. 04-51138, 2008 WL 3244071, at *7 (5th Cir. 
Aug. 7, 2008); Smith v. State, 839 N.E.2d 780, 784, n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Lee, 247 P.3d 470, 480-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
 
212 See also United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 679 (rejecting the argument that 
certain cell phone records were testimonial because they were not bills on the ground that 
they were still produced and maintained for business purposes). 
 
213 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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of privacy.214  What is knowingly exposed to the public cannot claim 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections.215  Similarly, a person loses an 
expectation of privacy in information they convey to a third party because 
they assume the risk that the party could disseminate the information.216  
Intrusion by the government into an area that lacks a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment and therefore is not prohibited.217 
 
[58] The Fourth Amendment makes warrantless searches performed 
without judicial approval per se unreasonable, subject only to a “few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”218  To protect the 
people and to sanction Fourth Amendment violations, evidence that is the 
fruit of an unreasonable search or seizure cannot be used in a criminal trial 
against the person whose rights were violated.219 
 
[59] Thus far, at least two differing views on the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to historical cell phone data have emerged.220  Two United 
States District Courts have held that no reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                                            
214 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
 
215 See id. at 351. 
 
216 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).  
 
217 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); see also United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983). 
 
218 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ). 
 
219 See Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 
670-72 (1961). 
 
220 Compare United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. 
Ind. Mar. 26, 2010), and United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB,  
2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008), with In re Application of the United 
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2010) 
[hereinafter In re Application 4]. 
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exists in cell phone records because users voluntarily convey the 
information to the phone company; thus the phone user assumes the risk 
that the information will be turned over to police.221  Therefore, the courts 
did not require a warrant to obtain this information.222 
 
[60] In contrast, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas held that a phone user does not voluntarily convey 
location information to the phone company when the phone scans the 
network while turned on or when it connects to the network during a call 
because the cell sites generate that information automatically.223  The 
court reasoned that the average phone user is unaware that companies 
could use cell site information to track their location, so they lack the 
requisite knowledge to assume the risk of disclosure.224  Accordingly, the 
court held that a warrantless seizure of “[t]wo months worth of hourly 
tracking data” was unreasonable because the phone user has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in prolonged surveillance of information, which 
reveals intimate details of the user’s life.225   
 
[61] Although accepting the prolonged surveillance theory, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York provided that a 
shorter period of surveillance does not raise the same constitutional 
concerns.226  The court held that the government’s seeking of historical 
cell site data for a three-day period and a six-day period, weeks apart, as 
                                                            
221 See Benford, 2010 WL 1266507, at *2; Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8. 
 
222 See Benford, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3; Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *11. 
 
223 See In re Application 4, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 836-37 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 
224 See id. at 843. 
 
225 See id. at 846. 
 
226 See In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Historical Cell Site Info., No. 11-MC-0113 (JO), 2011 WL 679925, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) [hereinafter In re Application 5]. 
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well as an additional twelve-day period several months later, did not raise 
the same privacy concerns corresponding to continuous monitoring over 
longer periods of time.227  Currently, it appears courts are divided on 
whether the Fourth Amendment protects historical cell site information.228  
Courts may begin to apply Fourth Amendment protection if the prolonged 




[62] Cell site data can track the location of cellular phones if enough 
information is available to perform triangulation.230  However, the 
accuracy of triangulation depends on multiple factors, from the duration of 
the call to the geography of the region.231  The interpretation of historical 
cell site data can prove a useful investigative tool, if law enforcement 
properly recognizes its limits.232  From such information, law enforcement 
can determine the general coverage area from which a phone call was 
placed, but not the precise location within that area.233  Historical cell site 
data can also show that a call was not made from a certain area.234 
                                                            
227 See id. at *2. 
 
228 Compare Benford, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3, and Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, 
at *16, with In re Application 4, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 
229 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
twenty-four hour surveillance of a person’s location over a month long period using GPS 
installed in their car without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment because a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy from prolonged surveillance of their daily life). 
 
230  See In re Application of the United States for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on 
a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 
231  See supra Part III.A.  
 
232  See supra Part IV.A. 
 
233  See supra Part IV.A.  
 
234  See supra Part IV.A.  
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 42 
[63] Once investigators obtain cell site data for a phone, special 
problems may exist in determining the identity of who used the phone at 
the time in question.  A defendant charged with a crime may prove that 
someone else possessed their phone or challenge the government to prove 
they were the unknown user of a pre-paid phone. 
 
[64] Lay witnesses should only testify to generally known information 
concerning cell phones, such as information contained in cell phone bills.  
Any analysis used to infer location from cell phone records should come 
in only through an expert.  When challenging an expert, the objecting 
party should consider the relevance, the expert’s qualifications, and 
reliability of the principles applied in the expert’s analysis.  If ruled 
admissible, the objecting party should vigorously cross-examine the expert 
on methodology to expose its accuracy limitations and the many factors 
that affect how a cell phone connects along a cellular network.  This also 
includes questioning an expert’s basis of knowledge of the phone and cell 
sites in question.  Once the proper subject of expert testimony is ruled 
admissible, opposing counsel should not forget to object if cell phone 
records are not properly authenticated. 
 
[65] Constitutional challenges to cell site data are limited.235  Cell 
phone records are admissible as nontestimonial business records and will 
only raise Confrontation Clause concerns if created to prove a past fact for 
the purpose of prosecution.236  Fourth Amendment precedent is split and 
parties should be aware that arguments exist for and against extending 
privacy protections to cell site data.237 
 
[66] A party offering expert testimony should recognize the limitations 
of using historical cell site data to track location in order to adequately 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
235 See discussion supra Part V.   
 
236 See supra Part V.A.  
 
237 See supra Part V.B.  
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prepare for and mitigate the effects of cross-examination.238  If properly 
incorporated, these records can successfully corroborate or rebut other 
evidence to help a party win its case.  Parties objecting to the admissibility 
of historical cell site data and related testimony should continue to raise all 
arguments available as they are gaining recognition.  Undoubtedly, the 
most vulnerable basis for objecting to cell-site data is by attacking lay and 
expert witness testimony.  In the future, courts may qualify more experts 
whose testimony is based on law enforcement experience in cell phone 
tracking rather than employment with service providers.  Therefore, 
objections should focus on attacking the methodology used by law 
enforcement and their knowledge of the cell networks.  Hopefully courts 
will preclude the admission of sub-par tracking testimony that is based on 
unreliable and unsubstantiated techniques.  As the use of cell-site date in 
criminal investigations steadily increases, courts will face more innovative 
and creative ways of using this data to investigate, prosecute and convict 
criminals.  However, courts must strive to ensure these methods are 
consistent with the rules of evidentiary admissibility before they are used 






                                                            
238 See supra Part IV.C.ii.c. 
